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Updating Discourse Context with Active LogicJohn GurneySoftware and Intelligent SystemsArmy Research Laboratory, Adelphi,MD 20783gurney@assb01.arl.mil Khemdut Purang and Don PerlisDept. of Computer ScienceUniversity of Maryland, College Park,MD 20742fperlis, kpurangg@cs.umd.eduAbstractIn this paper we present our implementationof a system of active logic that processes nat-ural language discourses. We focus on prob-lems that involve presupposition and the asso-ciated well{known problems of the projection ofpresupposition. We discuss Heim's largely suc-cessful theory of presupposition and point outcertain limitations. We then use these obser-vations to build our discourse processor basedon active logic. Our main contributions are thehandling of problems that go beyond the scopeof Heim's theory, especially discourses the in-volve cancellation of presupposition. Ongoingwork suggests that conversational implicatureand the cancellation of implicature can also betreated by our methods.Keywords: presupposition, discourse, context,accommodation, active logic, implicature.1 IntroductionDiscourses that involve presupposition present impor-tant challenges for research into the computational treat-ment of the interplay between discourse context and theow of utterances that comprise a discourse.Traditional studies of presupposition [2, 7, 15] havefocused on characterizing the \right" nal context re-sulting from a discourse while paying less attention toa realistic model of the intermediate processes involvedin achieving the nal context (or nal interpretation ofwhat was said). We think that there is much to be gainedfrom a more ne-grained approach, modeling the under-lying step-by-step reasoning a listener may perform dur-ing the unfolding of an ongoing conversation. Activelogic [13, 1] seems to us to be a potentially powerfultool for modeling such behavior, allowing contradictorybeliefs to trigger reasoned belief revision.In this paper we will examine a well{known theory ofcontext updating proposed by Heim [5]. This theory islargely successful in accounting for much of the complex-ity of processing discourses that involve presupposition.
We will point to some problems with theory. Followingthis we will present our implementation of an active logicsystem that is based largely on Heim's theory but usesthe unique machinery of active logic to deal with casesof presupposition cancellation and other related prob-lems. The complexity of discourse context updating canbe demonstrated by considering some of the canonicalexamples of presuppositional discourses.1.1 Canonical Examples of PresuppositionDiscoursesThe presupposition phenomena we will discuss occur inthe following discourses, which we will represent as se-quences of utterances like this:Dn = h u1,u2, u3, etc. i.We begin with a straightforward example which we as-sume is thoroughly unproblematic.D1 = h There are roses and tulips. But the roses are notyellow. iHere the second utterance u2 presupposes that there areroses. That is, even though u2 is a negation, the speakeris presupposing that there are roses to which he is refer-ring. He means only to say something about the color ofthose roses. The presupposition arises from the speaker'suse of a denite description \the roses". Now since u1has already introduced roses into the discourse context,the presupposition \there are roses" is unproblematic.We will say that u1 makes u2 felicitous.Now consider a more interesting, less straightforwarddiscourse.D2 = h There is no king. So the king is not in hiding. iHere u2 has the same essential form as the u2 of theprevious discourse; there is a denite description \theking" which could (in some cases) suggest a presupposi-tion that there is a king. However, in this case, u1 didnot introduce a king into the discourse context; ratheru1 asserts there is no king. So the context now entailsthat there is no king. Yet u2 is felicitous. In this case thedenite description does not ultimately project a presup-position.The next discourse shows a dierent way that contextinuences presupposition.
D3 = h If John has a son, then his son is not here.iHere the possessive noun phrase \his son" in u2 gives usthe potential presupposition that John has a son. But inthis context (as the consequent of the if/then sentence)that presupposition does not project. That is, this sin-gle utterance discourse has no presuppositions about theexistence of John's sons.Note that the next, similar, discourse does presupposethat John has a son.D4 = h If John has a car, then his son is not here. iThe next discourse displays what appears to be yet an-other way that a potential presupposition can be stoppedfrom projecting.D5 = h If I discover that Bill is in New York there willbe trouble. iHere the factive verb phrase \discover that Bill is in NewYork" has the potential presupposition that Bill is inNew York. This becomes apparent when we compareD5 to D6. Yet there is no presupposition in D5.D6 = h If John discovers that Bill is in New York therewill be trouble. iHere the potential presupposition that Bill is in NewYork survives. It projects up to sentence level and thespeaker is making that presupposition.These examples D1 through D6 are among the canon-ical cases that any theory of presupposition and contextshould predict. It is clear that presuppositional behav-ior is complex | even for relatively simple discourses.Apparently, certain syntactic forms (such as denite de-scriptions, possessives, and factive verbs) give rise topotential presuppositions which may or may not pro-duce a presupposition in the total discourse.1 One ofthe best theories designed to account for this complexitywas proposed by Heim [5] in the form of three rules forincrementally updating discourse context. These rulesaccount for all of the presupposition facts right in theabove examples. We will discuss Heim's rules in the sec-tion 2.These are the rules that we will use as a basis for ourimplementation of discourse context updating which wewill present in section 4. We will motivate our implemen-tation as one which (a) preserves the correct results ofHeim and also (b) deals with other examples such as D7,D8, and D9 below that Heim's rules do not account for.These three examples are supercially similar to thoseabove. However they present problems for a computa-tional theory of presupposition and context that havenot been widely discussed (but see the section 6 wherewe mention [9]).1For our purposes here we will only work with exampleswhere presupposition is caused by the use of a denite de-scription. What we say could also be said for some othersources of presupposition, including factive verbs as in D4,possessives as in D3 and cleft sentences.
D7 = h The King is not in hiding, Because there is noking. iHere after u1 there is a presupposition that there is aking. Then after u2 that presupposition is withdrawn.We call this \presupposition cancellation". This phe-nomenon is essentially linked to the ow of time in dis-course. Heim's rules (as well as many other theories) donot address this phenomenon. They deal only with caseswhere potential presuppositions may not project due tothe existing context { cases like D2 above. They do notdistinguish these cases from those where a presupposi-tion that was projected previously must later be with-drawn. We will call these cases \garden path discourses".First the hearer goes down a path assuming some pre-supposition; then he nds that he shouldn't have. Nowhe must retract that assumption. This is a place wherediscourse updating is nonmonotonic.The next discourse invokes two potential presupposi-tions.D8 = h There are no roses. So the roses are not in thefridge. iHere, u2 creates two potential presuppositions \thereare roses" and \there is a fridge". But only the latterprojects because the context after u1 entails that thereare no roses. It turns out that Heim's rules cannot ac-count for this example { even though this is not a gardenpath discourse. We will examine this case below in sec-tion 4.Here is the garden path version of D8.D9 = h The roses are not in the fridge. Because thereare no roses. iWe will use this discourse to demonstrate our systemfor discourse processing in section 4.2 The Theory of Context UpdatingHeim's theory of context updating has two parts:(1) a set of update rules(2) a mechanism for accommodation of presupposi-tions (which we will explain below).2.1 Heim's RulesHeim's rules for updating a discourse context are basedon a function called +. This is partial function thattakes as input a discourse context c an utterance u. Itoutputs a new context c0. Although we have no rigorousspecication of what makes up a discourse context wecan say that it is a set of propositions (or one inclusiveproposition) that should include the content of what ismutually accepted by the discourse participants.Many of the complex presupposition projection cases,including the discourses D1 through D6, are predictedby Heim's three rules of context updating, the ContextChange Potential Rules, the CCPs, to which we haveadded a basis rule CCPB.
CCPA: c + (u and v) = (c + u) + v. [conjunction]CCPN: c + (not u) = c n (c + u).2 [negation]CCPC: c + (if u then v) = cn ((c + u) n ((c + u) + v)).[conditional]CCPB: c + u = c \ [[u]]. [atomic basis]The rst three rules are rewrite rules for complex utter-ances. Repeated application of these rules will reduce acomplex utterance to a formula containing atomic utter-ances where rule CCPB can be applied. These rules ac-count for the complexity of presupposition by systemat-ically reducing complex presupposition problems to sim-ple ones.In the theory, propositions are taken to be sets of pos-sible worlds, while the utterances that give rise to andeect these propositions are tokens of natural language.In our implementation (in section 4) we will representcontexts and propositions syntactically (as logical for-mulas) but for the present we will stay with the possibleworld interpretations. So adding a new proposition to acontext amounts to the intersection of two sets of possi-ble worlds. This accounts for the notation in the basisrule CCPB which says that for a simple utterance takeits propositional content [[u]] and intersect that set ofpossible worlds with the context c. Updating reducesthe size of the set of possible worlds that constitute theevolving context.The rst rule CCPA is just what we would expect forstraightforward discourses like D1 above. Think of thetwo utterances of that discourse as forming a conjunct u1and u2. First we add the rst conjunct to the existingcontext to produce a new context. Then we add thesecond.Rule CCPN is an analog of a rule for logical conjunc-tion [[P ^: Q]] = [[P]] n [[Q]]. In eect, Heim can beassumed to be proposing that, for discourse updatingwhere the utterance is a negation, not u, we do the fol-lowing: (i) Start with the context c and then imaginethat the discourse had been u (the positive form) ratherthan the actual negation not u | but in the same con-text. Compute the updating of this imagined discourse.Next (ii) subtract the nal proposition that processingthis imagined discourse would yield from the initial con-text.A naive rule for updating contexts with negated ut-terances such asBADN: c + (not u) = c n [[u]]cannot be made to work properly. This rule can accountfor D1 but it cannot account for D2. On the other handCCPN can account for both of these discourses { as wewill explain below.The third rule CCPC can be derived from CCPA andCCPN.Now take discourse:2In general, pnq is the set theoretic intersection of p withthe complement of q, i.e., the subtraction of q from p.
D1 = h There are roses and tulips. But the roses arenot yellow. i First we apply rule CCPA to update thecontext with u1.c2 = (c1 + ( there are roses)) + (there are tulips)Then we apply rule CCPN to update the new contextwith u2.c3 = c2 n (c2 + (the roses are yellow)).But u2 has a presupposition, namely, [[there are roses]].This plays a role in these rules because the function + issubject to the restriction that c + u is undened unless cis a subset of (that is, entails) every presupposition of u.Thus the context for an utterance does, in fact, entail allpresuppositions of the utterance. In the present case, wecan see that c2 must entail [[there are roses]]. Therefore,the updating can proceed.2.2 AccommodationContext updating becomes interesting when we considerdiscourses where c + u is undened but where thingscan be made right through adjustments to the existingcontext. For example, assume that the initial context issomething irrelevant likec1 = [[grass is green]]3Assume a very simple discourse likeD = h John's son is here. iThe applicable rule is CCPAc2 = c1 + u1But the use of + would be undened here because c doesnot entail [[John has a son]] which is the presuppositionof u1. On the other hand, it seems that u1 should beperfectly understandable in this context. The story ofthe reason why goes like this: The person attempting tounderstand this discourse can easily just assume that c1should have entailed that John has a son. When a hearermakes such an assumption he is \accommodating" thespeaker [16]. In this case the hearer accommodates totransform c1 intoc10 = c1 \ [[John has a son]],thus making the updating dened after all. As a default,accommodation is permitted when required to make a +operation in a CCP rule dened (as it was in the abovediscourse D). Clearly accommodation is another sourceof nonmontonicity in discourse updating.2.3 Global and Local AccommodationAccommodation is also, however, a source of trouble forthe theory of context updating. The trouble is that,just as presupposition projection seems to be a complexfunction of various kinds of context, accommodation isalso variable. While the empirical facts of the matter arefairly clear, just when and how accommodation can beapplied is dicult to specify.Consider the discourse:3We choose [[Grass is green]] as a stand in for a contextthat is irrelevant to the discourse.
D2 = h There is no king, So the king is not in hiding. iHere, after c1 is updated with u1, we have a c2 that en-tails [[there is no king]]. This is interesting because u2has [[there is a king]] as a potential presupposition! Butwe cannot simply accommodate by adding [[there is aking]] to c2! That would make the context a contradic-tion.However, recall that the applicable rule CCPN analy-ses the updating process as follows.c2 + not (x is the king and x is in hiding) =c2 n ((c2 + x is the king) + x is in hiding).4Here accommodation is required because the rst + op-eration to the right of the back slash is not dened; c2does not entail the presupposition [[there is a king]]. Ifwe accommodate as in the previous discourse we wouldback up and add [[there is a king]] to the original c2.We would then go forward again using c2 0 in place ofc2. This type of accommodation is known in the theoryas global accommodation. However this would yield acontradiction in the nal updated context.As a way out, Heim suggests using what she calls localaccommodation [5]. Rather than back up to accommo-dated c2 and then go forward again to update with u2,we accommodate only the instance of c2 in the imagineddiscourse, to the right of the back slash.c3 = c2 n ((c20 + x is the king) + x is in hiding).Here c2 entails [[there is no king]] and c20 entails [[thereis a king]] as well as [[there is no king]]. Perhaps it is wor-risome that c20 is a contradiction. On the other hand itdoes, of course, make the rst + here dened. And sincethis contradiction appears to the right of a back slash,it will have no eect on that context c2 to the left. Thisprocedure ultimately leaves the proposition[[there is no king]]as the nal interpretation of discourse D2 { which wetake to be correct.2.4 Some Problems with AccommodationObviously contradictions and their avoidance (wherenecessary) play an important role in context updating{ along with the need to know (or deduce) what a con-text entails. However, there are two problems in usingaccommodation that remain unsolved.(1) Given both global and local accommodation, isthere a principled way to choose in every case?(2) Although local accommodation produce the cor-rect result for D2 it allowed a contradiction to appear inthe calculation. There are other discourses where thisfact ensures that the method will give the wrong results.We take (2) to be the more serious problem. ThediscourseD6 = h There are no roses, So the roses are not in thefridge i4From this point forward we follow Heim by using freevariable syntactic forms of sentences.
in which there are two potential presuppositions is a casein point.A speaker of this discourse could reasonably be takento be asserting that there are no roses while also pre-supposing that there is a fridge. The nal context c3should entail both [[there are no roses]] and [[there is afridge]]. The other potential presupposition [[there areroses]] should not project. After processing u1 we havethis updating calculation to perform.c3 = c2 n ((((c20 + x are the roses) + y is the fridge) +in(x, y)).c20 is the accommodated c2 which is now a contradic-tion, so the rst + is dened. But the second +, whichwill update with [[y is the fridge]] is now also dened.So there is clearly no need for any further accommoda-tion. That means that we never have to accommodatethe instance of c2 to the left of the back slash. As before,when all the + ing is over we have simplyc3 = c2 n [[contradiction]] = c2.So the potential presupposition [[there is a fridge]] nevermakes it into the nal context (although, of course, itshould).Our diagnosis is that something has gone wrong in thehandling of contradictions. The method of local accom-modation allows contradictions to appear in the formu-lae. In some cases they are harmless, in others not. Thetrouble was that once a contradiction appeared there wasno way to remove it. Although the theory accounts fornonmonotonic facts in some sense, the logic employedis in one sense monotonic. Once a proposition is incor-porated into a context it cannot be removed. We seethat, in this system, contexts always \increase" mono-tonically; thus the sets of possible worlds they representalways shrink monotonically.An active logic, by contrast, is one that will allowpropositions to be both added and later withdrawn fromthe evolving context. It also allows contradictions to ap-pear. In our implementation any explicit contradictionsare promptly removed. This kind of growing and shrink-ing of the context as well as the harmless appearance ofcontradictions require principled management. Activelogic achieves this by an explicit ordering of steps alongwith rules that may refer to previous steps. None of thiswas envisioned in Heim's system. Our hypothesis is thatwe can implement most of Heim's system in active logicand thereby properly manage the troublesome aspects ofcontext updating.2.5 Garden Path Discourses and CancellationWe have used discourse D6 to uncover a subtle problemwith, what we think, is one of the best theories of con-text updating. Recall thatD6 was not a garden path dis-course; it was very similar to the canonical examples ofthe set of presupposition problem cases that any theoryof presupposition and context updating should accountfor. On the other hand, the discourse
D7 = h The King is not in hiding, Because there is noking. iis a garden path discourse. Given our previous discus-sion, it should be clear that Heim's system will not han-dle this or any other garden path discourse without mod-ication. These discourses rst posit a presuppositionand then withdraw it. It may be conjectured that thereis an easy x { using backup and restart operations thatcould handle these garden paths. The reason we dis-cussed the subtle problem with the non garden path D6rst was to suggest that there may be no such easy xfor all cases.3 Active Logic Compared toNonmonotonic LogicActive logic [13, 1] is a family of formalisms developedfor the purpose of modeling the reasoning process in away that respects the passage of time as reasoning pro-ceeds. These formalisms have been applied to a numberof domains, from multi{agent interaction to deadline{coupled planning, from fully{decidable default reasoningto reasoning in the presence of contradictions, from cor-recting misidentication errors to perceptual reference.Rather than proceeding from one nonmonotonic the-ory (with one set of axioms) to another nonmonotonictheory (with an updated set of axioms) there is oneevolving theory in active logic. It models a process ofthinking that takes a reasoner from one belief state tothe next. As a default everything believed at step nwould be inherited to step n + 1. But there are variousrules that modify this blanket inheritance. For example,if p and not p appear at step n then the belief contra(p,not p) appears at step n + 1. Then both p and not p areblocked from inheriting to step n + 2. For our presenttask, this is perhaps the most important characteristicof active logic. It works by forward chaining from stepto step allowing contradictions to appear as they will.It uses detection of explicit contradictions to disinheritpropositions from the belief set. In this way active logicachieves some of the eects of various nonmonotonic log-ics but in a dierent way.In this paper we will present a treatment of the \fridgeand roses" problem D9, as a key illustration of our ideas.First however we provide some material to orient thereader to our system.4 Context Updating in Active LogicHere we present our implementation of context updat-ing in active logic for the purpose of understanding dis-course. For this we will be concerned primarily withformulae that represent the discourse context, that is,the record of what has been said up to the current step.At step n the information state might look somethinglikeStep n: ctxt([:::], n)
[:::] is an ordered list of logical formulae of the discoursecontext.Although some of the hearer's other beliefs will normallychange as the discourse unfolds we will ignore this pos-sibility and only represent beliefs that concern what wassaid in the discourse. Here we introduce some of thepredicates and rules used in our system.4.1 Predicates used.1. ctxt(c, t) represents that the context at time tconsists of the list c of formulae. For example,ctxt([assert(exists(x, king(x))), assert(hiding(x))],3) could be the context at time 3 in the mind ofa hearer. It will become apparent that, in general,there are many more active logic steps than utter-ances in a discourse.2. dfnt(X) represents a denite description in the ut-terance. This is a piece of syntax produced by theparser. An example would be dfnt(king(x)).3. ut(`X', t) represents that X has been uttered at timet.4. parse(X, t) is the parse obtained at time t by pro-cessing an utterance at the previous step, time t {1. If the previous step had a new utterance suchas ut(`The roses are red', 5) then we would ndparse(and(dfnt(roses(x)), red(x)), 6) at the nextstep. The potential presuppositions in most of ourexamples arise from the speaker using selected syn-tactic forms such as denite descriptions. Thereforeit is essential to parse utterances in such a way thatexhibits this syntax.5. update(X, t) represents at time t, elements ofthe discourse that still need to be incorporatedinto the context according to Heim's rules. Xis a list of contexts, atoms from the inputs andthe + and n operators. For example, just afteru1 of discourse D1 we would have something likeupdate([c1, assert(+, assert(exists(x, roses(x))), +,assert(exists(x, tulips(x))))], 3).56. presup(X) marks X as a presupposition in the con-text.7. exists(x, P(x)) indicates that an object with prop-erty P exists. This is the typical presupposition, forexample, presup(exists(x, king(x))).8. assert(X) marks X as having been asserted by anutterance.5In the code for our implementation we use a postx or-dering of the operators + and n. This facilitates parsing for-mulae according the CCP rules. In this paper we leave thoseoperators in their places (as inx operators as they appear inHeim's CCP rules) for better readability.
9. contra(X, Y, t) indicates that there is a contradic-tion between the formulae X and Y in the con-text at time t   1. In our implementation, onlyexplicit contradictions can be detected. An ex-ample is contra(assert(not(exists(x, king(x)), pre-sup(exists(y, king(y))), 4))). Here an assertion isfound to contradict a presupposition at time 4.10. kill(X) indicates that formula X has been markedfor killing. It will not be inherited to the next step.In our system both members of a contradiction aremarked kill, so neither will be straightforwardly in-herited to the next step.4.2 Rules of inference used.The rules will be presented in the form:i: Xi+1: YIf X is believed at step i, then Y is added to the beliefsat step i+1. Nothing else is added to the beliefs that isnot mentioned by these rules.1. i: ut(`X', i)i+1: parse(Y, i+1)where Y is a parse of X. If X is heard as an utteranceat step i then the parse of X appears at the nextstep.2. i: ctxt(C, i) parse(X, i)i+1: update(Z, i+1)This is where a syntactic parse of an utterance getstranslated into a form ready for the application ofHeim's CCP rules. For example, given ctxt(c1, 1)and parse(and(dfnt(roses(x)), red(x)), 1) at time 1,we get update([c1, +, dfnt(roses(x), +, red(x)], 2)at time step 2.3. i: update(X, i)i+1: update(Y, i+1)where Y is the result of executing the rst opera-tion in the list X. There are several cases dependingon the operator and on the form of the operands.For example, given update([c1, +, dfnt(roses(x), +,red(x)], 2) at time 2, we will have update([c1 +,red(y)], 3) provided that exists(y, roses(y)) appearsin c1. This case is an illustration of the rule CCPAwhere no accommodation was needed because c1 al-ready entailed the presupposition of dfnt(roses(x)).These active logic rules are the ones that implementthe CCP rules along with global accommodationwhere necessary as described in section 2.4. i: update(X, i)i+1: ctxt(X, i+1)This rule is a sub case of the previous and is appliedwhen all context updating is complete for one par-ticular utterance. Once the update is complete, the
new context is put back into the set of beliefs of thesystem.5. i: ctxt([:::, foo(X), :::, bar(not(Y)), :::], i)i+1: ctxt([:::, kill(foo(X), :::,kill(bar(not(Y))), :::,contra(foo(X), bar(not(Y)))], i+1)This rule detects direct contradictions in the con-text. Here, X and Y are uniable and foo and barare either assert or presup. Note that both membersof the contradicting pair foo(X) and bar(not(X))are tagged for killing at i+1. The next rule decideswhich member of the pair can be inherited to thenext step.6. i: ctxt([:::, kill(foo(X), :::,kill(bar(not(Y))), :::,contra(foo(X), bar(not(Y)))], i+1)i+1: ctxt(Z, i+1)Z is the context resulting from resolving the con-tradiction agged at step i. The contradiction canbe resolved by using various additional sources ofinformation.6 In our system, an assertion is alwayspreferred for inheritance over a presupposition.All rules are active at all times. That is, if a rule ap-plies at a step, it always res at that step. There is noneed to employ resolution between conicting rules. Sys-tems of nonmonotonic logic often resort to conict reso-lution and prioritizing of default rules. These measuresare applied to avoid the appearance of contradictions. Inour system we can manage contradictions. We let themarise at one step whereupon we disinherit them at thenext step while choosing which contradictand to kill.4.3 Output Trace for Discourse D1We now present some of the steps of the output trace forD1. Some details are not shown, for example the argu-ment representing time in the predicates.D1 = hThere are roses and tulips. But the roses are notyellowiWe assume the initial context is null, containing no in-formation.Step0 ctxt( [], 0),ut( `There are roses and tulips')Let c1 = [].71 c1, parse(and(exists(x,R(x)),exists(y,T( y))))This is the result of parsing the utterance and inher-iting the previous context.6See Miller [13] for more on contradiction resolution inactive logic.7We will use ci for both the list of formulae in the contextand for the predicate ctxt(ci, j). Which is meant will beevident from the context.
2 c1, update([c1,+, exists(x,R(x)), +, exists(y,T(y))])This step readies the information from the utterancefor application of the CCP rules.7 c3At the end of processing the rst utterance, the con-text contains the assertions that there are both rosesand tulips in the discourse context. We now add thenext utterance.8 c3, ut(`But the roses are not yellow')9 c3, parse(not(and(dfnt(R(z)),Y( z))))The new utterance has been parsed and we now needto incorporate it into the context. For this exercise, weare ignoring rhetorical words like `but' and `because'.10 c3, update([c3, n, c3, +, dfnt(R(z)), +, Y(z)])This sets things up for the application the rule fornegation CCPN. Since there is a denite description ofroses, the system rst looks for exists(y, R(y)) in c3which does in fact include it. Thus updating can proceednormally.14 c3, update([c4, n, c6])Here everything from u2 has been absorbed into c6.All that remains is to combine c4 with c6 by set dier-ence.The nal context for D1 isctxt([assert(exists(x,R(x))),assert(exists(y,T(y))),assert(not(Y(x)))))4.4 Output Trace for Discourse D7Below we will display some of the output from our sys-tem processing D7 This is the garden path version of thediscourse involving two potential presuppositions thatwe discussed earlier.D7 = hThe roses are not in the fridge. Because there areno roses.iHere we have a case where something is rst added tothe discourse context only to be later removed. Based onour analysis above, Heim's system cannot deal with thisdiscourse nor its cousin D6. Our diagnosis was that sinceHeim had to avoid a contradiction in the nal context,accommodation of the presupposition of the denite de-scription \the roses" was done locally. In our systemwe can manage contradictions. Therefor we can alwaysaccommodated globally. The signicance of this will be-come clear where we discuss steps 3 and 4 below. Aspredicted by Heim's analysis, global accommodation forexamples like these will lead to unwanted contradictions.In active logic if a contradiction arises we simply disin-herit it at the next step. In this way our system canproduce the correct results for D6 as well as D7.For D7 we can see that Heim's strategy of choosing lo-cal accommodation to avoid global contradiction (which
worked for D2) is not even applicable. After u1 the con-text should contain two presuppositions, that roses existand that a fridge exists. Then, after u2, the rst presup-position should be withdrawn. We will show that this isa fairly straightforward process in our system.Step0 ctxt( [],0) ut( `The roses are not in the fridge')Let the initial context be null, c1 = [].1 c1, parse(not(and(dfnt(R(x)),dfnt(F(y)),in(x, y))))This is the result of parsing the utterance u1 and in-heriting the previous context.2 c1, update([c1, n, c1, +, dfnt(R(x)), +,dfnt(F(y)),in( x,y)])The update predicate renders the parse of u1 into theproper form for the application of the CCP rules.3 c1, update([c2, n, c2, +, dfnt(F(y)), +, in( x,y)]The next applicable rule is CCPA which applies to[c1, +, dfnt(R(y)]at step 2. Since we have a denite descriptor, we rstsearch the previous context c1 for a previous mentionof roses. As there is none, we accommodate (globally)the context with the presupposition that there are roses.Thus c20 here at step 3 includes the information thatthere are roses. Since we began with a null context wehave a very small context at this point.c20 = [presup(exists(x, R(x)))]In our system we always use global accommodation.That means that both instances of c1 in step 2 get ac-commodated with the presupposition. We don't have toworry about using local accommodation (in which onlythe instance of c2 after the backslash would be accommo-dated) because our system can eliminate contradictions(in a controlled way). Of course, in this example, Heim'ssystem would also have used global accommodation be-cause there was no threat of a contradiction arising.At step 11 (below) all of the rst utterance has beenprocessed and the next utterance is perceived.11 c4, ut('Because there are no roses')Herec4 = [presup(exists(x,R(x))),presup(exists(y,F(y))), as-sert(not(in( x, y)))])and we are ready to process u2 which should cancel oneof the presuppositions in the current context. Since u2itself has no presuppositions it will be added to the con-text c4 in a straightforward way, using the rule CCPA.We skip down to step 21 where u2 is fully incorporatedinto the context.21 ctxt([presup(exists(x,R(x))),presup(y,F(y)),assert(not(in(x,y))),assert(not(exists(z,R(z))))
We now have a context which presupposes that thereare both roses and a fridge but which also asserts thatthere are no roses. At the next step the contradiction isfound.22 ctxt([kill(exists(x,R(x))),presup(y,F(y)),assert(not(in(x,y))),kill(not(exists(z,R(z))))contra(presup(exists(x,R(x))),assert(not(exists(z,R(z))))]The formulae that caused the contradiction appear atthis step agged for possible killing. One or both willnot inherit to the next step. Nor will the contra formulainherit to the next step.Spreading the reasoning over steps is necessary toproperly manage all this. The system can reason at onestep on the basis of something that appears at a previ-ous step, even though that something does not appear atthe current step. This ability is important to the propermanagement of contradiction.23 ctxt([NULL(exists(x,R(x))),presup(y,F(y)),assert(not(in(x,y))),assert(because),assert(not(exists(z,R(z))))The contradiction has disappeared. Using the fact thatone of the contradictands was a presupposition and theother an assertion we disinherit the presupposition andwe reinstate the assertion that roses do not exist.24 ctxt([kill(exists(x,R(x))),presup(y,F(y)),assert(kill(in(x,y))),assert(because),assert(not(exists(z,R(z))))Since we are asserting the roses do not exist, we have tomark any formulae about roses for killing.At the end of processing D7, we have the followingcontext.ctxt([presup(y,F(y)), assert(not(exists(z,R(z))])Note that, even though other things were said in the dis-course, the nal context includes only two items. Thereis no information about roses not being in a fridge. Thefact that the speaker said the roses were not in the fridgeis part of the meta-linguistic information about the dis-course. In the canonical presupposition examples we aretreating, meta-linguistic information is, of course impor-tant. We represent and use this information via our utpredicate. However there is a discernable concept of thecontent of the discourse that is separate from the linguis-tic events and facts. This is what we have been callingthe context and representing with our ctxt predicate.The other facts (ut, parse, etc.) are however still avail-able. They inherit through all steps but we have onlyshown them where they play a role in reasoning fromone step to the next.
5 Conversational ImplicatureWe believe that presupposition and conversational im-plicature [3], illustrated by the two examples below, aredistinct discourse phenomena. This is a point we willdevelop on another occasion. However, both phenomenaare nonmonotonic in that both can be either blocked orcancelled as a discourse progresses. We have modelledand implemented this aspect of implicature using activelogic. In this section we will briey discuss the currentstate of our implementation.Using a simple example of a dialog with an implicaturethat arises part way through and then is later retracted,we have modelled in active logic how Gricean maximsand nonmonotonicity may relate to each other and toa computational treatment of implicature. In eect weseek to track reasoning along Gricean lines over time.In this work we wish to seriously consider how cancel-lation of implicatures might work and how to implementthe actual positing and withdrawal of implicatures in realtime. Our hypothesis is that the same underlying frame-work of active logic that we have applied to presupposi-tional inference in real{time (evolving) dialog{processingalso is applicable to inference of implicatures.We have been concerned with two dialogs that requirethe hearer, Kathy, to gure out an implicature in or-der to realize the import of the speaker's answer to herquestions. In the rst example Bill has given an indirectanswer to her question followed by an explicit cancella-tion.(A) Kathy: Are the roses fresh?(B) Bill: They are in the fridge.(C) Bill: But they're not fresh.In the rst example Bill has given an indirect answerto her question followed by an indirect cancellation.(A) Kathy: Are the roses fresh?(B) Bill: They are in the fridge.(D) Bill: But they are old.For our implementation we will appeal to three ofGrice's maxims. These are usually stated as rules fora speaker in a cooperative conversation. They come intoplay in discourse processing when the hearer makes es-sential use of one or more of the maxims in his reasoningabout what the speaker means by an utterance. That is,the hearer in some way assumes the speaker is adheringto a maxim an uses that assumption to gure out some-thing that should follow from an utterance. We havemodelled how this works for certain yes{no dialogs likethose above.The maxims that play a part in out system are themaxims of quality, Quantity, and Relevance:The Maxim of Quality: Always make your contribu-tion to the conversation truthful; or don't say somethingfor which you do not have adequate evidence.The Maxim of Quantity: Always convey as much and
no more than is required for the purposes of the conver-sation.The Maxim of Relevance: Always make your contri-bution relevant to the purposes of the conversation.In our implementation which we discuss in more de-tail in [4], we have not represented any of the Griceanmaxims explicitly. We regard them as specications forbuilding a discourse participant. Each of our discourserules articulates one or more of the maxims. The systemconsists of (a) rules representing three kinds of knowl-edge and (b) an inference procedure that applies theserules repeatedly taking us from one step to the next.The three kinds of knowledge are: the active logic meta{theory, general beliefs about dialogs involving questionsand answers, and background beliefs about refrigerators,roses, food, and so on.The meta{theory rules say things like: If there is acontradiction don't inherit either alternative, Otherwiseinherit anything that you can, and Update the time by 1from one step to the next. The discourse rules say thingslike Believe anything that the speaker informs you, Be-lieve any direct response to your question, and Try togure out what an indirect response to your questionmeans. The background beliefs say things like Thingsin fridges are cold, Cold roses are fresh, and Things infridges are edible. These last three beliefs happen to bedefeasible; the rules will only re if the right hand sidesof these rules cannot be proven false.The relation of our rules to Grice's maxims can beexplained as follows: The rules about believing the con-tent of any utterance implement the maxim of quality.The rule dealing with indirect responses relates to boththe maxim of quantity and the maxim of relevance. Forit is this rule that produces the relevance beliefs likerel(fresh(r1)):infridge(r1). These are the beliefs that be-gin a search for relevant rules to re that may lead to ananswer to one's question. In our model for the rst ex-ample (above) Kathy begins looking for and answer im-mediately after hearing (B) They are in the fridge. Thereis no waiting to hear what comes next. We can view thisas following the maxim of quantity; Kathy assumes forthe moment that Bill has said all that is relevant. Fromthis she infers the implicature that the roses are fresh;that is she thinks that Bill has answered her question at(B). But no harm was done, since implicatures can becancelled. Our system performs this kind of generationand, where appropriate, cancellation of implicature.6 Related ResearchThere are numerous theories of presupposition, accom-modation, and the projection of presupposition. Thereare fewer computational implementations. And of thesemost do not discuss or attempt to treat the cases of ac-tual cancellation as happens in D5 and D6. We havechosen to study and adopt Heim's theory because it cov-ers many of the problematic cases and it also suggests the
kind of step by step, forward chaining reasoning of activelogic. Ours is an approach appealing to nonmonotonicreasoning. Other nonmonotonic approaches to presup-position include those of Mercer [12] and Marcu andHirst [9].Mercer employs a system of default rules to model thepresuppositions arising from syntactic forms that appearin utterances. In [12] he deals with adverbial implica-tures such as the following.If John kicked the ball, then Bill kicked the ball too.If Fred called yesterday, then he will call again today.In these cases the adverbs \too" and \again" give riseto potential presuppositions; that someone else kickedthe ball and that Fred called before. But in each case thepotential presupposition does not project. The exampleswe have been discussing are mostly cases of existentialpresupposition triggered by denite descriptions. We donot think that this is an important dierence from Mer-cer's examples for the phenomena under study and webelieve that we could in the future bring adverbial andother sources of presupposition into our system. Theimportant similarity between Mercer's paper and oursis the concern with the complexity of presupposition.Mercer's if/then sentences block presupposition just asthe if/then utterance in discourse D3. Now Heim's CCPrules which we implement are intended to account forprojection in if/then sentences in a well{founded, uni-form way. Therefore we expect that our system can dealproperly with Mercer's examples. A major dierencebetween Mercer's approach and ours is that he does notaddress the time evolving positing and cancellation ofpresupposition. This is a constant theme in the compar-ison of our approach with others.Marcu and Hirst [9] present a system designed tohandle cancellation of presuppositions. But they takean approach quite dierent from our approach. They donot model the step by step incremental reasoning aboutcontext. Rather they compute an entire new theory af-ter each utterance. Although we have not veried this,their system may be able to get the correct results formost if not all of our examples. It appears that theywould deal with a discourse like D7 by rst comput-ing the two presuppositions after u1. Then, after u2they would discard all beliefs and compute a fresh setof beliefs consistent with the entire discourse. They alsodevelop an ontology based on Meinong's theory of ob-jects. They use this ontology to deal with discoursesabout ctional entities and discourses that involve pre-supposition. We believe, along with others [2, 5, 6, 14,8] that presupposition can be treated separately fromctional discourse and that we can achieve this withouta Meinongian ontology. The ultimate success of our ap-proach would bear out this claim.McRoy [11, 10] presents an abductive treatment of
misunderstanding in dialogs. By way of contrast we usea largely deductive (though time{situated) inference en-gine. As McRoy and Hirst note, a deductive approachleads to contradictory beliefs and the need for belief re-vision. However, in our approach, belief revision is han-dled as part{and{parcel of the inference process; it doesnot require an additional module or phase of processing.Moreover, contrary to [11], we do not need to assumethere are no \abnormalities"; or rather any abnormalityis easily retracted later in the dialog when new evidenceis heard.Thus our approach is an exploration of the utility oflargely deductive methods in natural language process-ing; when contradictions arise, our logic engine appliesthe applicable rules. As shown in our output traces insection 4 and in Miller [13], active logic engines are of-ten able to reason quite eectively with contradictions.It is that fact that provides the underlying frameworkthat we are exploiting.7 ConclusionIn conclusion, we have shown that active logic can beapplied to the problem of updating according to the +function in Heim's system of rules for discourse context.Heim's rules account for important eects of complexstructure in utterances. And active logic accounts forthe problem of how to alter a given context by both ex-panding and contracting contexts as required. In thisway the resources of active logic can be brought to bearon an important class of problems in natural languagediscourse processing. Well{known problems of presup-position projection can be accounted for as well as newproblems exemplied by cancellation of previously in-ferred presupposition.Our long-range goal in this work is the designand implementation of a time-situated natural-languagediscourse-understanding system based on a formal the-ory of pragmatic reasoning. Among the issues for the fu-ture research there is the following question: At any time(or step) in the discourse process there can be implicitcontradictions { ones that have not yet been detected.Our current system only detects explicit contradictions.A question is: could this lead to trouble in a discourse?One answer is Perhaps not; perhaps a feature of a co-herent discourse is that the speakers quickly say thingsto prevent such problems. If so, the fact that our sys-tem may be vulnerable to this kind of bad discourse mayindicate that we are on the right track. This is a mat-ter for empirical investigation. One immediate goal isto unify our algorithms for presupposition and implica-ture, to facility treatment of both of these in the samediscourse.AcknowledgementsThis research was supported in part by the Army Re-search Laboratory through a contract from the Army
Research Oce and in part by the National ScienceFoundation. We thank Betsy Klipple, Jean Braithwaite,Michael Miller, and Michael Morreau for helpful discus-sion.References[1] J. Elgot-Drapkin and D. Perlis. Reasoning situatedin time I: Basic concepts. Journal of Experimentaland Theoretical Articial Intelligence, 2(1):75{98,1990.[2] G. Gazdar. Pragmatics, Implicature, Presuppositionand Logical Form. Academic Press, New York, 1979.[3] P. Grice. Studies in the Way of Words, chapter Pre-supposition and Conversational Implicature. Har-vard, Cambridge, Ma., 1989.[4] J. Gurney, D. Perlis, and K. Purang. Activelogic applied to cancellation of gricean implicature.AAAI Spring Symposium on Implicature, 1996.[5] I. Heim. On the projection problem for presupposi-tions. In S. Davis, editor, Pragmatics. Oxford, 1983.[6] L. Kartunnen. Presuppositions of compound sen-tences. Linguistic Inquiry, 4:167{193, 1973.[7] L Kartunnen and S Peters. Conventional implica-ture. In Choon-Kyu On and Dinneen David, A.,editors, Presupposition, volume 11 of Syntax andSemantics. Academic Press, Orlando, 1979.[8] Paul Kay. The inheritance of presuppositions. Lin-guistics and Philosophy, pages 333{379, 1992.[9] Daniel Marcu and Graeme Hirst. An implementedformalism for computing linguistic presuppositionsand existential commitments. pages 141{150. In-ternational Workshop on Computational Semantics,1994.[10] S. McRoy and G Hirst. Abductive explanations ofdialogue misunderstandings. pages 277{286. Asso-ciation for Computational Linguistics, 1993.[11] S.W McRoy and G Hirst. The repair of speech actmisunderstandings by abductive inference. Compu-tational Linguistics, 21(4), 1995.[12] R. E Mercer. Solving some persistent presupposi-tion problems. COLING, pages 420{425, 1988.[13] M. Miller. A view of one's past and other aspects ofreasoned change in belief. PhD thesis, Departmentof Computer Science, University of Maryland, Col-lege Park, Maryland, 1993. (Directed by D. Perlis.).[14] S. Soames. How presuppositions are inherited: Asolution to the projection problem. Linguistics In-quiry, 13:483{545, 1982.
[15] S. Soames. Handbook of Philosophical Logic, vol-ume IV, chapter Presuppositions. Reidel, 1989.[16] R. C. Stalnaker. Presuppositions. Journal of Philo-sophical Logic, pages 447{457, 1973.
